Rav

Is there a progressive case for the war on Iraq?

Tony Blair has pinned his career on continuing support for British troops' involvement in the ongoing US-led attack on Iraq. Do the arguments stand up? Can a leftwing, internationalist case be put forward to support war?

David

The first assertion that is made I wholeheartedly agree with; Tony Blair has pinned his career as the leader of our country on his policy with regards to Iraq. This is in fact what makes certain people great leaders, those who are firm and unwavering upon a point of principle that is of great importance, with or without the support of those they lead. I am firmly of the belief that people from all sides of the debate will agree that the role of a leader is to lead, on the basis of their principles and the information they are exposed to, and not to follow. If therefore this sees the beginning of the end of Tony Blair as our leader, I would say it will be because he was determined to be wrong in his beliefs, rather than wrong to believe that he should have led from principle as opposed to public support. But perhaps it is still a little too premature to analyse the long-term effect on Tony Blair’s leadership, and, more to the point, this issue is about something much broader, deeper, affecting individuals across the world in a much more serious manner than one mans career prospects.

The clever use, intentional or otherwise, of particular phraseology and semantic language are used to create a rhetorical questions that are quite obviously impossible to answer. To suppose that such questions can be polemically proven or destroyed ignores the pragmatic nature of the way our world and our history develops. It is a common misunderstanding that we must be able to support or justify military action. During an epoch of history we are naturally unable to prove any course of action to be the right or correct one. If such justification is ever possible, then history will be the only judge, and even then it will be a fleeting conclusion. So I will not attempt to justify why we have to take military action, neither will I try to prove that there were no alternatives, because I believe that there were. Rather I will put the case as to why, in the causal sense, we are now at war, and why being now at war, we must now remain to be at war.

I am not a pacifist, neither am a warmonger; I believe that war has to be the last resort. That is why I vehemently argued that the correct course of action was for the continued weapons inspections. I believed then, and I believe now, that Iraq is a potential threat to the security of the world, although I acknowledge that it is, at present, of a lesser extent than as to others might have us believe. However because Iraq was identified as a particular threat, and in turn the attention of the ‘terrorist issue’ sifted, so it did become more of a threat, and consequently it became an threat that was necessary and essential to deal with. So it was clear that we needed a diplomatic solution to the Iraq issue. The world need to unite and collectively state the case for weapons inspections, and that it did. To ensure the efficacy of the inspections the threat of potential force needed to be clear and visible, and that it was. To display the potential benefit to the Iraqi people of disarming there needed to be a promise to end trade sanctions and of future economic prosperity, and that there was. If all sides had perfect foresight, able to understand how one cause of action would affect another, it is clear to me that the most preferable and least damaging result for all was for Iraq to be disarmed, and to disarm itself, under this plan. But it was not to be.What happened subsequently cannot be understood purely from a theoretical or ideological perspective; it must be examined from a rational and realpolitik angle. Namely that the causality between the diplomatic, political and military pressure and build-up acted as a feeder-process and led us prematurely to war. It shouldn’t have and it was desirable that it didn’t happen, but it did, and it did so because the factors that would have subdued the process could not outweigh those that inflamed it.

There are, and will be, many ifs and buts that remain. If the Iraqi leadership could have been more conducive, if the Americans could have been restrained from the notion of regime change, if more support (tacit or ortherwise) could have been obtained from the Arab nations, if only the British had more time to garner support in Europe, if the weapons inspectors had just a few more weeks, and so on. But it was not to be. The military timing for war took precedent over the political timetable during ‘peacetime’, that for me is the saddest part, that it was determined in such a reverse logic order. But is there now a case that we should withdraw our forces? What could that achieve, would it not be more wrong to have shown that the West will pre-emptively invade a country and then not continue in a course that it so boldly pushed for? Of course it will save lives in the short-term, men, women and children will die. But I do not accept the notion that if you have a case for continued military action then consequently you must be ruthless and cold-blooded.

Both sides can work out crude calculations of the above type, one that innocent Iraqi civilians will be losing their lives, the other that the Iraqi’s will eventually be liberated and so save lives in the long term. Both are flawed as by definition we can only ever observe the results of one mutually exclusive course of action, the results that another would have brought can only be guessed at. Perhaps history may shed greater light, that we can now largely agree it was right to stand against fascism and Hitlerism is remarkable, but I refuse to make allusions and comparisons to past-times to make a case for present events. History may be our guide, but it cannot be our master. So where does my ‘argument’ resolve me on the varied polemical debate? I sought a diplomatic solution that could have avoided a war, for I believe that war was not predetermined, and that Iraq could have been disarmed peacefully. But in reality it was this very peaceful solution I followed that led us by consequence into conflict.

In the realpolitik world there was not the calming influences that the diplomatic solution pre-supposed. It is bad for the world and the future of the world that we are now at war. But bad is not the same as worse, and I believe it would be worse if we now withdrew and left having become involved. Whether a withdrawal will at some time in the future become the preferable outcome I cannot say, but I assert that it is not now. Furthermore I maintain it would be worse had we done nothing at all, and not sought the peaceful solution that paradoxically led us to war.

Rav

Ok, Some valid points. I concur to some extent that Tony Blair is right to trust his own judgement, and i don't buy the argument that the opposition of the majority of the population alone should have stopped him entering the war; however, I wouldn't want to go to the other extreme of saying, as soem have done, that the PM as the elected leader must have our unconditional support, whatever his decisions. There's an element of trust at the heart of democracy: elected leaders are given a certain amount of leeway to go against the public will (the abolition of the death penalty being the famous example), but there's an implicit faith that they won't go beyond a certain level of public resistance on important issues. If this faith is betrayed, the public loses faith in democracy, which is why it was right and proper for the Tories to back down over the poll tax.

On the wider point, I don't accept that it's impossible to answer questions regarding the acceptablity or morality of contemporary policy or events. I accept that history will ultimately be the judge of each generation's actions, and that even history rarely speaks with a single voice; but to say that therefore it is meaningless to attempt to judge the moral case for our action, and those of our elected leaders, seems relativivst to te point of fatalism. Ultiamtely, it is our fate as electors and as human beings to have to attempt to judge and decide upon the events of our time. Mr. Blair doesn't have the luxury of trusting to history: he has had to make decisions, and each of us as his electorate have to make our decisions about the choices he has made.I accept that, in the midst of war, it may seem a little rhetorical to discuss the rights and wrongs of the conflict. I believe that the debate needs to continue, because the manner in which the action in Iraq is judged across the world in the next few years will have enormous implications of the likelihood of further conflict, and the future of international relations. For example, if German public opinion remains vehemently opposed to war, it will make it harder for Herr Schroeder to back down from his current position of opposition, as there is evidence he wishes to do.

However, at this point I would rather take issue with your analysis of how the war came to be.Your depiction of the process that lead to war seems excessively teleological, and presents the pull of war as something of an irresistable force. For example, you state that Iraq "was identified as a partcualar threat," and as a result became more of "a threat that was necessary and essential to deal with." It's important not to remove the personalities from this issue: the American civilian right wing, exemplified by the Project or a New American Century, identified Iraq as a threat; it didn't happen by osmosis, and certainly not by concensus. You also imply that the increasing pressure on Iraq was a result of September 11, but the PAC and various other groups had been targeting Iraq since the early nineties, and it's reasonable to assume that an attack was certainly being onsidered in the Bush administration since the 2000 election. The effect of September 11 was to increase the sense of urgency, and to create the mood, in both the domestic and, to a lesser extent, the international spheres, that would make war feasible.

Thirdly, I don't accept that by being identified as an urgent threat by the American administration, Iraq suddenly became an urgent problem. Indeed, the root of the opposition to war by both France and much of the public wasn't so much the conviction that the inspections were the answer than the feeling that doing nothing - continuing the policy of containment," in diplomatic terms - would be preferable to war. This was the crucial difference between Iraq and Afghanistan, where a clear and present danger had been identified.Resolution 1441, and the resumption of waepons inspections, needs to be seen in this light. It's true that the Security Council united around an attempt at a solution through inspections. What that hides is the different perspectives from which the Security Council arrived at that position. For the US, weapons inspections were expected, if not designed, to fail, and were a tool to convince the rest of the Council that military action was necessary; indeed, Colin Powell was essentially a lone voice in the administration for acepting inspections at all. The UK, if not sharing the US' feelings, were certainly aware of them. For others, notably Frace and Syria, the resolution was aimed primarily at preventing a US military action, and although few of the Council were unhappy to see resolutions resume, many would have been happier if Iraq and simply been left alone. This was by no means an honourable position, but it was there. The line that the international community has long agreed on the need to disarm Saddam, and simply disagreed on the means, is false.

In next stage of your analysis, you argue that the momentum of the military and diplomatic process hastened the rush to war and made it impossible to resist. Again, you apear to have substitiuted hitorical forces for personalities. In the First World War, the balance of power systems in place actually did act to tumble Europe into an "accidental war." In the case of Iraq, however, it is possible to identify forces pushing in favour of military action, and forces resisting, right up until the outbreak of war, and to put names and faces to them. In short, the US military decided it was mid-march or a six-month delay; the French, and the majority of the Security Council, wanted to give the inspectors extra months, rather than days; so the US decided to go ahead without the UN. None of that is any great secret. So to attempt to portray it as some sort of regrettable accident is unwise and misleading.

The reason why I think it is so crucial to identify the forces pushing in each direction at each stage is this: when you do so, it becomes clearer that this war is entirely the product of the US administration; at each stage, from conception to execution, it has been the US that has been pushing towards war, and at each stage they have met resistance from, principally, France, Germany, Russia, China, and many of the world's publics. To point this out isn't necessarily to argue that the US was wrong to urgently wish to depose Saddam through military means, although I would argue that they were; it is simply to put the responsibility, be it in the form of blame or credit, where it is due.

It may, therefore, be an indication of the dubiousness of the case for immediate military action, that Tony Blair and other war leaders have attempted to present it as an unavoidable product of events. Tony Blair, commiting thousands of British troops to Iraq, told the Commons that the decision to take military action had not yet been made, and would be avoided if possible. Yet justweeks later, he argued that the Commons must support war, because our troops were stationed there now, and we would look weak in the face of evil if we were to turn back. This is the worst kind of circular logic: if the decision to commit troops committed Britain to war, then it should have been at that point that the Commons was consulted. Similarly, although Resolution 678 is the key to the Attorney General's legal case for war, it is Resolution 1441 that is being held up by Blair and others as the political justification. The UN promised serious consequences, he argues; if we do nothing, we won't be enforcing the UN's will. But "serious consequences", as everyone knows, is what the UN says when it specifically doesn't want to threaten war; indeed, at least one of the supporters of 1441 (Syria) expressly stated that they supported it because it would force the US to go back to the Security Council before action. To argue, as you do, that the attempt at a peaceful solution "lead us to war," ignores these crucial complexities.

Perhaps it's not surprising you see the war in structural, machine-like terms: you are an economist, after all. Realistically, though, this war, more than any previous western war, appears to be the action of few individuals. Even the Vietnam War can be seen as an inevitable result of the US' Cold War paranoia about Communist collaboration, and its obsession with the Domino theory. No such overarching ideological or theoretical background applies here, which is why even in America the war has met substantial opposition. Therefore, at the risk of sounding like a shouty teenager, while I share your sadness at the situation we find ourselves in, for me it is tinged with anger.Which still leaves the question of where we should go now. I accept that, given the commitment the "coalition" has made, a total withdrawal now would be a mistake, for the chaos it would leave in Iraq and for the succour it would give to dictators and terrorists. But there is another issue here besides the strength of the west in the eyes of dictators and terrorists: that is, the strength of the US in the eyes of the international community. The continued arrogance and unilateralism, in my view, poses as much of a threat to the world as WMD and rogue states - not, I hasten to add, because the US administration is equally evil (it isn't), but because it is so important. The resolution of all the key issues facing the world community - AIDS, Climate Change, the Middle East - are all dependent on the US' willingness to co-operate with world institutions. I believe, therefore, that a British witdrawal from the Gulf would be desirable and prudent. While it would not cripple the coaliion militarily, and therefore woud not prevent the success of the military action, it would send a clear message to the US administration that it cannot continue to ignore its allies. I'm not suggesting an angry volte-face by the British government, simply a military retreat behind the Kuwaiti border to a backup role, couched in diplomatic language about the level of public opposition.

It has been argued that the best way to rein in the US is through partnership; but despite all Blair's best efforts, he has failed to rein the US in on this occasion; they only went along with the UN until it was clear it wouldn't give them the result they wanted. The only solution is for Europe to move to a more united front, not against America, but to keep the US in line with the UN. British support would give such a "Euro-Axis" a crucial credibility it currently lacks, owing to US perceptions of French anti-Americanism.

David

I think perhaps in your hastiness to lambaste my admittedly somewhat structural viewpoint, you have oversimplified some of my points and missed the parallels between the arguments. My teleological explanation was vague on the specifics, as it was intended to allow for particular emphasis on the differing factors, and it was abridged in order to economise on space and enable readibility. First though I’d like to briefly refer back to my point about the ethics of war.I categorically did not say that that it’s impossible to ask or even answer questions regarding the acceptability or morality of contemporary policy events. I made the point that often in reality there will not be a clear resolution of an issue based on morals.

When therefore we are presented with mutually exclusive policy decisions, both sides can and will try to claim the moral monopoly when really neither case can be proven or decisive. I find the Blair moral case for war as equally frustrating and unappealing as I do the anti-war moral case. The point I’m driving at is that I do not believe that the issue of war in Iraq can be won or lost solely on its morality. That’s why I specifically said at the beginning of my argument that I would not attempt to justify the war.Just to make an historical allusion – if you had been asked on the 1st August 1945 whether it would be morally justifiable that the United States would drop two atomic bombs on Japan the following week, would you have been able to answer? At the time you wouldn’t know how many civilians would lose their lives, how it would affect the politics of the post-nuclear world and even whether it would end the long and bloody war. Sixty years on I still find it hard to say that I could have a monopoly on the moral case for or against using that atomic bomb. I’m not saying that you should ignore moral issues, just that they need to be included as part of a broader debate.

Now I’ll come to the much longer point you made regarding my depiction of the lead-up to the war. I wasn’t using the terms of military, diplomatic and political pressures as naively as you seem to believe I was. Admittedly I didn’t expand on them to the extent that you have; this was more due to me condensing my argument as opposed to me not understanding the issues. I made it clear then, and I’ll do so again, that whilst there was an ongoing threat from Iraq, the extent and timing to which it became a dominating issue wasn’t directly correlated to any real increased threat. I don’t think, however, that it’s unfair for me to say that the increased focus on Iraq was not unrelated to the events of September 11th. Whilst I agree with you that Iraq may have been an unresolved and underground issue in America throughout the nineties I severely doubt that any American government could sell this war to their citizens without what happened on 9-11 happening. Maybe I over-emphasised the self-fulfilling nature of identifying Iraq as a threat and it then becoming one; this is perhaps due to a personal hang-up from a particularly persuasive undergraduate lecturer on the dynamic inconsistency of policy decisions. But I do believe that this had an effect, the need for credibility in contemporary American foreign policy cannot be ignored.

There are many parallels between our arguments. I think it’s unfair to label my original argument as fatalistic or that it was based on some sort of hypothesis of accidental occurrence of events. I agree that the interactions between the various forces were active well before resolution 1441, but I do not agree that war was predetermined at this stage. Yes, the American administration expected conflict to be the result, and Powell was alone on going down the UN-route, and it was the most probable outcome, but it wasn’t unavoidable. It is wrong, however, for Blair and Bush to use 1441, and its unanimous adoption, as justification for war as this blatantly ignores that the majority of the security council members originally signed up to it namely because of the assurances that there was no automaticity built into the resolution. That makes the whole ‘serious consequences’ argument irrelevant, however any party now interprets those words, it was assured at the time that they would not be a trigger to war. I think something in particular we agree on are the dangers resulting from the hegemony of power that the United States now holds. But I don’t think that the only way to counteract this power is to unite with Europe to keep the US in line with the UN.

It’s a somewhat rosy history of the UN that many commentators are now presenting to us, it’s not by any means a unique scenario for a resolution to be vetoed on the Security Council but then still be carried out by a member state or group of member states. I’m not opposed to the UK continuing to play its current ‘bridging role’, and further I think it’s healthy that there is a plural approach from Europe. Whilst we might categorise the various European nations as either pro or anti-war, this can ignore the very differing reasons which brought them to that conclusion. I too find it very frustrating that the US seldom co-operates with the world institutions on the dominating issues you mention – AIDS, climate change, the Middle East etc… Particularly so for the fact that at times when it suits her to do so, the US will hide behind isolationism, and say the world has no right to impose its values on her, and then at other times will take the pro-active world-leader role, stamping her authority on all who oppose her. It needn’t be mentioned that this hegemony really is the legacy of the cold-war, an issue which I’m sure we’ve discussed at length before. America finds herself now in a difficult position, it is no longer possible to close the borders and nail down the hatch, but then again as the dominating world-power it puts herself in the front line of world critical opinion.

I don’t think that America is quite the evil imperialist nation that it is sometimes presented to be, although I wouldn’t doubt there are these forces present within the makeup of the US. I think it needs to be appreciated just how different the agenda and value-system is at all levels in America as compared to the outside world, it’s too easy to label Americans as ignorant and unable to understand wider issues. The international institutions and consensus generated therein at the end of the Second World War aren’t, I believe, quite in danger of collapse at this moment of time. Yes, it is a very testing time, but this is naturally just about the lowest point that relations can reach on this issue, and the institutions will regain their strength. Most definitely it is essential for the US to involve the UN in post-war Iraq, both with regards to the immediate situation in Iraq and the long-term sustainability of UN as a credible institution.

Once again though, I’d point out that Europe and the UN should present a united approach but still recognise the plurality of opinions that member nations have. To swiftly conclude as regards the current position, a British withdrawal into Kuwait would have serious repercussions and consequences. It’s clear that the US is the decisive military force in Iraq, but we shouldn’t underestimate the level of involvement and role for the British troops. A long-drawn out war is as unhealthy for Iraq and other Arab nations as it is for the United States. To use a Montgomery cliché the obvious and real challenge is now to win the peace rather than just the war, but I think a quick end to the conflict is very much a central part of this.

Rav

With regard to the moral issues, what exactly are you defining as "a broader debate?" What other factors are you including besides morality? I take it you're seperating out the moralisms of "will this war save more people than it kills" from the hard realities of realpolitik, economics and so on. I think to see these factors as in some way seperate from the moral questions is a common mistake. If you're balancing the needs of Europe's security against the need for Middle Eastern stability, for example, then morality infuses every aspect of that debate. Different leaders will "put the West first" more than others, but those nuances are part of each leader's moral outlook in power. So all the factors you're implying come into the issue, such as the need for consistency in US policy, come into the moral issue, and can't be separated. To use another example, in defending CAP, M. Chirac isn't compromising the "moral" case for opening European markets to African agriculture against the "amoral" issues of domestic politics and the wellbeing fo his farmers. These are part of the same issue - if Chirac doesn't want to lose the election, it is because he believes "good things" that he intends to do will go undone, leaving France worse off. If he puts French farmers first, it is because he believes as their representative, it is his duty. That moral view may be flawed - in the case of CAP it certainly is - but it is a moral consideration, nonetheless. As the point of elected politicians is for them to make things "better," both for their people and the world community, any considerations that affect that can be considered "moral". Isues such as economics, which are often protrayed as seperate form morality, infact have morality at their heart when used to inform decisions. Seeing economic growth as a Good Thing is an ideological decision, and is based on moral theories - of progress, of utility, etc. Just because things aren't the subject of feirce debate doesn't take them out fo the sphere of morality. The decisions made may be rght or wrong, "moral" or "immoral," but they cannot be considered "amoral" - they can't be denied moral status. I think there's a tendency to see "morality" being something that only happens when governments think internationally - the most famous recent being the "ethical foreign policy."On another point, of course there will often not be a "clear resolution" of a moral issue - if an action, or issue, were demonstrably "right," it would happen with so little fuss that it wouldn't even be recognised as an issue. So the view that taxes should be kept as low as possible became so totally a part of the poltiical landscape in Britain in the 1980's and 90's that there was, for all intents and purposes, no argument being made, except on the fringe, that taxes should rise to pre-Thatcher levels. It was simply a given. But even these issues are often devoid of disagreement simply because affected groups are not heard - so higher taxes are being at least considered an option again now, in correlation with the greater voice of public sector workers, Trade Unions etc. under a Labour Government. So uncertainty is something we must accept, and all policy decisions are to some extent a gamble. But we can't duck these decisions - or rather, those whose job it is to make them cannot. My point is simply that of we expect out leaders to make a decision based on as much information as they have, then we should expect ourselves to carry out a similar process with the information we have. To use your example, while I agree that it would have been hard to assess the morality of the atomic bomb, Truman couldn't avoid the issue. He had to listen to the Army estimates of the casualties, the tactician's assessments of its impact on the Japanese, consider the messages it would send to Stalin, etc, and accepting the high levels of uncertainty surrounding the issues, he had to drop it or not drop it . If his electorate expect him to make such decisions, shouldn't they feel qualified to form their own view on "what they would have done?" You're right to point out that both sides tend to oversiplify the moral case for their view - but that is the nature of politics, which has always lead to polarised positions. The whole of western poliics is supposedly classified into "socialist" and "conservative", so of course things are presented as more black-and-white than they are. But it is possible to refute arguments that are logically flawed, and so on. Perhaps "justify" the war was a bad choice of words. All the pro-war camp can really hope to do is to make a convincing case for war that appears morally sound, and all the anti-war campaign has to do is refute it, or to prevent a more viable alternative. What I was asking was whether there was a case to be made for war that was in line with progressive values, internationalism, a general sense that one western life isn't worth twenty Arab ones, etc.But enough of the rhetorical stuff. The War, and After. There seem to be two viewpoints developing on how Europe should "handle" the US: the "Chirac" model, of establishing a strong Europe to act as an alternative force on issues such as Palestine, essentially a sort of "bipolar" model; and the "Blair" view, that the US is best held through partnership, and the same Euro-US front that was sustained throughout the Cold War. It's no surprise, therefore, that NATO, which personifies that united front, has become the most obviously tretened institution, especially given the palns for a Euro-army. The "Chirac" view has various flaws, eg: The extent of divisions within Europe (especially as the new European states are more pro-US by instinct), public opposition to integration in member states, etc.However, the "Blair" model seems flawed in more fundamental way: the partnership never actually appears to reign the US in. Iraq is the most recent example: the US will bend to gain international support, but will act without it.In a way, Chirac seeks a sort of benevolent version of balance-of-power international relations, while Blair seeks more concensus. The problem with Blair's vision is that it leaves the US' position as the world's only superpower unaltered, and essentially reinforces it by aligning Europe up as a satellite. In the Cold War, it was logical for the West to line up behind America, as Russia was there to provide a balance of power. Without an "alternative empire," any system that doesn't provide a counterpoint to US power will struggle to rein the US in. Furthermore, continued US dominance increases the chance of China setting itself up as an aternative epicenter in the future. But Europe's potential as an alternative influence is highly questionable: not only its ability to do so, but its usefulness - its attitude to the Middle East doesn't match up to its rhetoric, and in its economic relations to the Global South it's often worse than the US (CAP again). Indeed, neither the Blair or Chirac view affords much increase in influence to the world's poorest.I was going to argure, liberal-style, that the answer lies somewhere between the two views I've outlined, that Britian can be a bridge but be more willing to go against the US when it's really necessary, etc. But I've come to the conclusion that no attempt to adapt the old reliance on power bloc balance to the post-Cold War world can work. Instead, the restraint (where necessary) of the US, and of every other country, must be carried out through a fortification and expansion of the existing international institutions - and by international, I mean global. The dispute over Iraq was portrayed by both sides as Europe versus the US, but opposiiton to the war was widespread i the global south - and this cannot all be dismissed as "anti-Americanism" of the sort that led to September 11. The only force that could push the US to act more in the interests of the whole world is one that represents the whole world. Europe is neither willing nor able to do this. Such a force would also be more able to tackle the other unchecked power causing concern across the world - transnational corporations.I realise this is all a bit utopian. But the idea isn't new. The whole point of the UN - and the League of Nations before it - was to replace the balance-of-power peace that led to WW! with a more rational system of Collective Security. Thanks to the Cold War, balance-of-power returned, and the UN was rendered largely irrelevant. Subsequently, Collective Security has never been fully attempted by the whole international, or even Western, community. So what makes me think it maight be time to rethink it? Three reasons: a perception that the US can't be left to be the only superpower unchecked; an increased awareness (on the left) of the need to restrict the power of Corporations; and above all, the simple fact of economic globalisation, which may prove to be a more powerful and permanent force than the regionalisation embodied by the EU, NAFTA, etc. The State has consistently grown, and spread, in line with the growth of economies and the spread of industrialisation. Now, if we have a global economy and global industrialisation, is it not logical to state the case for more Global Government?

David

It seems, Rav, that you increasingly wish me to take an approach akin to Euclid’s rationality, such that you force me back to my axiômas. So then, in true form, I’ll argue with respect to a developed posit, and then attempt a synthetic presentation beyond this.

I expressly differentiate between moral guidance and moral authority. Naturally moral guidance is intrinsically part of debate and policy development, in the sense that it relates to personal principles of what is right or wrong. Therefore, in so far as individuals and representations vary as regards principle and perspective, there is, and will be, an omnipresent moral element. The reference to ideology clearly demonstrates this, that in essence an ideology is based on a moral theory, thereby all argument from a principle or perspective necessitates moral guidance. I take this as a given. This, however, is quite different from a moral authority, or, as I previously referred to it, a moral monopoly. As you quite rightly admit, a ‘clear resolution’ of a moral issue is rare to the point of non-existence, and when it can and does exist it will be a non-issue. So this precisely validates my previous point, that neither opposing case on the Iraq issue can be proven with a total moral authority. Differing perspectives may use their moral guidance, one might say that it is morally wrong to kill any human, another might say that it can be morally right if this action saves the lives of a thousand other men. That is why I state that the claims of moral authority need to be included into a broader debate. There will, of course, be a sense of moral guidance in all areas of the debate, from hard economics to humanitarian aid, but a decisive moral authority is unattainable for all opposing factions. The Blair moral case for war was as unappealing as was the blindly pacifist case.

The problem with popular opinion for Blair in the months leading up to war were that we were sold a one-dimensional case one week, only to be presented with a very different reason the following week. The public then took this as an uncertain and undefined pretext for war, and moreover interpreted it as a classic case of ‘spinning’. In my belief, the Blair case would have been much more successful if the varying arguments had been laid out simultaneously, displaying their inter-relatedness, and with the moral case for war as part of this broader argument.

As regards the international institutions I think we are beginning to see them regain their strength, and moreover we need them to because they have a vital role in both the post-conflict situation in Iraq and for the future stabilisation of the world. The Bush-Blair meeting in Belfast and Straw-de Villepin meeting in Paris demonstrates the manner and efficacy of the ‘bridging role’ that the UK can play. Many of the hawks in the US administration have been unwilling to involve the UN in the reconstruction efforts, on the premise that in not supporting the original collation line that the UN is now essentially a ‘dead institution’. However I think that Blair has played an important part in persuading the US to allow the UN to have a supporting political role, more than just the original intended humanitarian role. The British proposition is that the UN should give its approval to a three-stage process in Iraq, moving from a military rule to an interim Iraqi administration to a full representative government. Obviously the period of military rule will last several months, which practically can only be under UK and US control. The interim Iraqi administration, whilst not having executive powers, will gradually assume governmental responsibilities. At this stage United Nations involvement and approval is more than desirable. It is essential for the future of Iraq.

UN approval will open the door for international aid and financing from the European Union, the World Bank, the IMF and many of the other multilateral organisations. This would require a new Security Council resolution, most likely to include an affirmation of Iraqi territory in order to bring on board the Arab states. The new resolution, however, still needs the support of the big countries that opposed the war – France, Germany, Russia etc… This is where the UK ‘bridging role’ is at its most useful, and it’s interesting to note that de Villepin himself is now stressing the “common values” shared and the agreement on “higher issues”. Kofi Annan is also showing his eagerness to involve the UN, despite his disapproval of the war, and is currently on a diplomatic mission to those big three opposition countries and then to Britain, in order to work out the finer details of the UN involvement. The big stumbling block for myself is the transition phase between the interim authority and ‘representative’ government. The Pentagon has already flown its favourite exile, Ahmed Chalabi, head of the Iraqi National Congress, to central Iraq, along with his band of followers. There will naturally be large power vacuums in the Iraqi civil and governance structures that need to be filled in the next six to ten months, and there will be a tendency, deliberate or otherwise, for the Iraqi’s favourable to the American administration to be proposed. There is also a danger of the erosion of Iraq’s recent secular history, as to whether the Shi'ite majority may now seek disproportion influence in the future government, and from the potential threat from more fundamentalist groups. The one group that will clearly not be ‘liberated’ are the Kurds in the north, as the Turks have been guaranteed the territorial integrity of Iraq, and so there is no possibility of a Kurdish homeland state. The only olive branch the Kurds will be offered is a certain degree of regional autonomy, and they will remain the largest stateless ethnic group in the world.

Moving beyond Iraq, I think that there is a strong future for the international institutions, and American involvement in them. When Bush first became president it seemed that US foreign policy would be characterised by non-involvement in key world issues, most notably in the Middle East. Moreover it seemed to be dominated by the principles of Condoleessa Rice, that the US would always remain stabile provided there was a concentration on the big world-nations, cold-war-style, focusing on bilateral rather than multilateral relationships. But the situation post-September 11th has shown this to be outdated, and that the US needs to pay attention to both the smaller nations, and on the diplomatic channels both between and across the larger nations. I accept the need, and am in favour of a more global role of the international institutions, but it’s hard to see how there will be any consensus about the future democratic structure to replace that at present. To take the example of the global economy, it is in effect managed by three of the big institutions – the IMF, the World Bank Group and the WTO. The IMF has the role of ensuring short-term macroeconomic stabilisation, although does involve also itself in longer term development issues, the World Bank on poverty reduction measures and the WTO on removing trade obstacles. The flow of finance is obviously one directional, though is governed by a structure determined by the amount of aid contribution. In the case of the IMF each member has a special drawing right, and a vote determined loosely on the basis of this, thereby for example giving the US 17.1 % of the voting power, the UK and France 4.95% each, Japan 6.14% and Germany 6%. Key players on the United Nations, such as China and Russia, only have voting power of 2.94% and 2.75% respectively. One might argue that such a democratic structure would be preferable to the present form in the UN, in that all nations, however small, have a say in this format, but in reality it’s still dominated by the major nations.

Of course you could argue to skew power on the basis of alternate measures, such as population, resource ownership or otherwise, but then the larger nations would reduce their contribution as per their voting power. It’s not a problem too devolved from the current issues of European enlargement under the Agenda 2000 programme. Original EU member states are unwilling to extend the same membership benefits such as the CAP and Regional Development Aid to the new Central and Eastern Europe members as they will be disproportionally subsidising these economies. The institution most in need of reform is the United Nations, where the vetoing powers of the Security Council are totally unrepresentative of the modern balance-of-power, the big five are such only on account of being the victors of the Second World War. Issues of transparency, accountability and deomocracy are key to the challenge in reforming the UN. But once again, it’s hard to see how there will be a consensus to shake up the UN and the other institutions. Perhaps reform should be a longer-term goal, the more pressing one to be to ensure the stability and involvement in them.Key to this is the attempt to involve the US in some of the other contemporary and dominating world issues – the International Criminal Court, The Kyoto Climate Change agreement, the Comprehensive Nuclear Testing Ban, ABM, Landmines and so on. Only through respect for international law and institutions will it be possible for the US to deal with their major foreign policy challenges, from terrorism to the Middle East, North Korea, Iran and India-Pakistan.

Rav

Regarding the philosophical moral guidance/authority issue, I see the distinction you're making, and accept your point that on this basis niether case can be argued to have a total moral authority. This seems so obvious as to be almost a non-point. As I pointed out, and you seem to accept, this impossibility fo total certainty can't be allowed to prevent us from forming opinions, campaigning etc. on his or other issues. Your criticism of the varying cases for war presented by the Blair government is correct, but I don't believe it would have been possible for the government to present a joined-up case from the very beginning. The "moral case for war" seems so flawed, and was employed so shamelessly and so late in the day, it's hard to believe it was anything other than spin - or, in war terms, propaganda. It can't be coincidence that the "moral case" was rolled out for the first time on the day of the massive demonstration in February; or that the speech Blair gave to present it, among the most important of his career, appeared rushed and ill-written; or that the messianic fervour with which Blair justified the war in Afghanistan at the 2001 Conference was entirely absent. I can't believe, although everyone else seems to, that Blair was himself convinced that the Iraqis would welcome British troops with open arms; the argument was simply used when it became clear the public were not convinced of the "self-preservation" case for war, primarily owing to the lack of hard evidence of WMD. The "moral" case has entered into American rhetoric even more recently, only since war began; imagine how quickly it would be abandoned by both the US and UK governements of WMD were actually to be found! In retrospect, the "moral case" for war seems like a last-minute change of marketing strategy, rolled out as a response to the success of the anti-war movement; the public was right to greet it (initially) as classic spin.

In the long run, though, the strategy has been an almost total success. While the entire country has by no means been convinced of the "moral case" for war, the debate about the war remaining in the mainstream media has accepted it as the main motivation behind UK involvement, and framed the debate around it. For example, pro-war papers have focussed almost entirely on the "liberation" issue in place of the previous emphasis on WMD, while anti-war papers such as the Independent have presented incidents such as the Baghdad market bombing as showing the limitations of "humanitarian war," rather than the human cost of western security.With regard to the future of Iraq, you've identified the likely problem correctly - not the establishment of miltiary rule or the transition to an interim authority, but the move from there to democratic government. This is something which hasn't yet happened in Afghanistan, and is traditionally the point where large countries fall out over the extent of "liberation-" historic examples including the Soviet Union's refusal to allow elections in Eastern Europe in the 1940's and 50's, and the US' similar refusal to hold democratic elections in South Vietnam in line with the Geneva Accords. The defining factor will of course be the manner of the government the US expects to win elections; in the current policy climate it's hard, for example, to see them holding elections likely to elect a muslim government. Pressure from the multinational trade lobby would also probably prevent elections that would return a left-of-centre government. It's a common misconception about Vietnam, Chile etc. that the US imposes pliant regimes on countries as part of some grand plan for world domination; what usually happens is that the US gets rid of an unacceptable (to them) government, and installs the most obvious source of authority as the new leadership; these authorities then act as staunch allies to the US out of indebtedness and the need to maintain aid, etc. The US usually then turns a blind eye to future human rights abuses etc by the new power, not for strategic reasns, but simply because it believes its role to be completed.

So for example, the US didn't impose Pinochet on Chile as a puppet dictator, despite the likelihood of oppression; they simply let the group most well positioned, the army, to take power. They wouldn't have allowed another left-wing authority ot take over, but they didn't exactly go looking for a loyal lapdog. And despite the famous quote about Pinochet being "a shit, but our shit," (or whatever, I forget the choice of words), the US didn't turn a blind eye to human rights abuses because they needed Pinochet's support; they simply didn't care, any more than they do now about the Burmese junta, etc. So while I don't see the vast imperialist conspiracy that some anti-war activists do, I believe the US will let somebody (probably Chalabi) take over who will fail to set up democracy properly and moer than likely commit human rights abuses, and that the US will wash their hands of responsibility.

As regards the international institutions, I share your essential pessimism about reform, especially with regard to the IMF and World Bank, where the disproportionate influence of richer countries is supposedly justified by their being the contributors and creditors. However, that doesn't prevent the rich countries taking steps to strengthen these institutions by applying the same standards to themselves as they do to poorer countries; the obvious examples being reducing Agricultural subsidies, pushing the US to revive its contributions to the UN and sign up to Kyoto, and so on. Of course international institutions will always be dominated by their most powerful members, but it's a shame rich countries aren't more bold in using the institutions to put pressure on the US in ways they couldn't through traditional diplomacy. Obviously Tony Blair can't bawl Bush out over Kyoto, but it's hard to believe that Mr. Greenstock and other western representatives couldn't work with other signatories to put serious pressure on the US within the UN, without causing a real diplomatic imbroglio. One reason for people's resentment of the special relationship" is that, while Blair is always passionate about the areas where we agree with America, he's usually half-interested at best aboutthe areas where we might seek to influence them; Kyoto is trotted out as an example, but we don't actually do anything about it. Conversely, disputes with Europe (Iraq, tax, Human Rights act etc) are emphasised in government rhetoric, while areas of common ground are played down. Talk of a "bridging role" ignores the fact that Blair sees it as his mission to reform Europe, while he accepts a role in relation to America that is essentially one of following - we're their "ally," while in Europe we're supposed to be "leaders."The same applies to the WTO, etc. While accept the difficualty of reforming the institutions to give LEDC's more of a voice, it's hard to see how else significant changes in policy will come about unless the rich countries resolve as allies to use the institutions to put more pressure on the US. In this context it's the UK and Spain rather than France that appear to be jeapordising the UN's authority.